Imagination, Delusion and Hallucinations

By G. Currie. 2000

167 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Clinical Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0f983d862690db2c1eb3c9b0f0c9e40158b0dcd6

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Citations in the corpus

Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account (2001, background): “• Is a delusion always a belief? Might some delusions have some but not all of the characteristic properties of a belief? For example, Currie (2000) suggests that some delusions may actually be imaginings that the delusional subject misidentifies as beliefs.”
In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions (2005, background): “The third assumption in the account put forward by Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) derives its inspiration from an hypothesis about schizophrenia developed by”
Self, Solipsism, and Schizophrenic Delusions (2001, background): “…at all obvious that a notion of reflexive meta-representation makes sense in relation to efferent feedback, which, in fact, is a far more basic and low-level capacity that is believed to operate throughout much of the animal kingdom and is perhaps present even in the fruit fly (Currie 2000, 173).”
Understanding beliefs (2015, background): “Currie (2000) suggests there are two stages of delusion formation from imagination: first, a misidentification of imaginings as reality and second, a propensity for imaginings to become beliefs.”
Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception (2008, background): “In a similar vein, Currie (2000) has argued that delusional patients mistake their imaginings for believings: the Capgras patient might believe that he believes that his wife has been replaced by an impostor, but he doesn’t believe this, he merely imagines it.”