Disclosure Quality and Management Trading Incentives

By Jonathan L. Rogers. 2008

175 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0f72083a1f2677ff520e0d5b30d6d4193a34bc89

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Citations in the corpus

Audited Financial Reporting and Voluntary Disclosure as Complements: A Test of the Confirmation Hypothesis (2012, unknown): “The proxies have been studied extensively in prior literature (e.g., Baginski et al., 1993; Skinner, 1994; Baginski and Hassell, 1997; Rogers, 2008).”
Narrative Disclosure and Earnings Performance: Evidence from R&D Disclosures (2014, unknown): “Similar to Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009), I include controls for the natural log of”
Disclosure Tone and Shareholder Litigation (2011, methodology): “Because courts recognize unusual and substantial insider selling as one way of demonstrating scienter, many lawsuits include insider selling allegations (Johnson et al. 2007; Rogers 2008), especially after the enactment of the PSLRA.”
Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision (2013, methodology): “To facilitate comparison with the findings of Rogers (2008), Column (1) reports the results for the base model.”
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Managerial Rent Extraction: Evidence from the Profitability of Insider Trading (2013, background): “7 Consistent with the literature (e.g., Cheng and Lo 2006; Gu and Li 2007; Rogers 2008), we focus only on open market transactions and exclude transactions relating to stock options from our analysis.”
Selection Bias and Econometric Remedies in Accounting and Finance Research (2011, unknown): “skipped and never modeled in Rogers [2008]. More than two choices of treatment are common in accounting and finance research.”
The role of the media in disseminating insider-trading news (2016, unknown): “After the rule change, insiders were required to make these filings within two business days of the trade, and most filings are now made within this period (Brochet 2010; Rogers et al. 2015). Second, before 2002, it was not clear exactly when outsiders could access the information in SEC filings, wh”
Big Data as a Governance Mechanism (2019, unknown): “The literature on insider trading has found that managers exploit their superior information for personal trading gains (Piotroski and Roulstone 2005; Rogers 2008).”
Motives for disclosure and non-disclosure: a framework and review of the evidence (2006, background): “In related work, Rogers (2005) shows that managers tend to disclose more when they are buying firm shares on their own account and disclose less when they are selling shares.”
Corporate governance and the profitability of insider trading (2016, unknown): “return volatility (VolatilityAdj), insider ownership (OwnOfficer), insider trading volume (TradeFirm), analyst following (Following), institutional ownership (OwnInstitution), and litigation probability estimated using the Rogers and Stocken (2005) approach (Litigation).”