Thinking Without Words: An Overview for Animal Ethics

By J. Bermúdez. 2007

422 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0e82ee6c4e69c32496b8e965141dfce4eec12675

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Education

Citations in the corpus

How to ascribe beliefs to animals (2020, background): “In a different vein, some philosophers argue that some animals have representational beliefs that cannot be understood as propositional (Camp, 2009; Glock, 2000; 2010) but as based on imagistic representational systems (like diagrams or maps) (e.g. Camp, 2007; Bermúdez 2003).”
The nature of epistemic feelings (2014, background): “It seems that the capacity for introspection is reserved for those living beings that possess the mental concept of PAIN, but to be able to use that concept in reflection it also seems necessary that one possess a language (Bermúdez, 2003, 2009) and a theory of mind (Bogdan, 2010; Flavell, 1998).”
Knowing What? Radical Versus Conservative Enactivism (2005, background): “In distinguishing between linguistic and non-linguistic thoughts Bermúdez calls the distinction into play, remarking that “It does not seem right to describe the processes of thinking-how as defined over states with determinate content” (Bermúdez 2003, p. 37).”
The Centrality of Language in Human Cognition (2016, background): “One reason it is so important to understand the proper place for language in human cognition is that it remains our best bet for understanding this difference between human and nonhuman minds (Bermudez, 2007; Bickerton, 2014; Carruthers, 2002; A. Clark, 1998; Dennett, 1996; Spelke, 2003).”
Primate Cognition (2010, background): “It would be nice if in addition we make progress in testing the hypothesis of Bermudez (2003) that the causal reasoning of animals in terms of antecedent-consequent events is a starting point for the counterfactual ‘‘if–then’’ reasoning of humans.”
Darwin's mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds (2008, neutral): “Relational problems at the most complex end of the spectrum require increasingly abstract, non-domain-specific representations including, at the limit, extensive linguistic scaffolding (see Bermúdez, Gentner & Christie). As Clark and Thornton (1997) pointed out in this journal a decade ago, relation”