Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Our Argument

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A Simple Model of Inefficient Institutions (2006, neutral): “social welfare functions giving different weights to the elite, the middle class and the workers (see, for example, the Appendix to Chapter 4 in Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006a ).”
Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes (2015, background): “Armed with this knowledge, they can engage in strategic concessions to preempt violent popular revolt (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Bohlken, 2010; Desai et al., 2009) or the coalescence of elite opposition (Greene, 2007; Magaloni, 2006).”
De Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence (2006, background): “In this paper, we make an attempt to highlight some important mechanisms for understanding simultaneous change and persistence in institutions.”
Democracy and State Capacity: Complements or Substitutes? (2015, neutral): “Instead, as argued in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), autocratic rulers are not immune to such pressures, and repression is not the only tool in their arsenal to manage them.”
From Internet to social safety net: The policy consequences of online participation in China (2019, background): “Democratization is often seen as a means to rectify the political inequality in autocratic systems (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Meltzer and Richard 1981), although the empirical evidence on the equalizing impact of democratization still remains mixed (Gallagher and Hanson 2009).”