Using 'bill and keep' interconnect arrangements to soften network competition
By Joshua S. Gans, Stephen P. King. 2001
166 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Media Technology, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0d22785c6f6b5655320d2134e0383162abd5c6f4
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In Electrical and Electronic Engineering
In Media Technology
In Strategy and Management
Citations in the corpus
- Investments and Network Competition (2003, unknown): “This is important since previous literature has found that – without taking into account asymmetries or investment choices – firms that offer two-part discriminatory pricing would select access charges below cost (Gans and King, 2001).”
- Network competition in nonlinear pricing (2003, background): “Gans and King (2001) show that, as with industrywide network externalities, the presence of such firm-specific network externalities induces firms to agree on an access charge below marginal cost (a c0).”
- Mobile Call Termination (2009, unknown): “See Armstrong (2006) and Armstrong and Wright (2007) for general analyses of competitive bottlenecks.”