U.S. Cross-Listings and the Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from Dual Class Shares

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Institutions and Information Environment of Chinese Listed Firms (2012, background): “…greater transparency and stricter disclosure standards have the potential to strengthen corporate governance by improving monitoring and limiting consumption of private benefits by controlling shareholders (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Stulz, 1999; Doidge, 2004; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004).”
The Long-Term Effects of Cross-Listing, Investor Recognition, and Ownership Structure on Valuation (2006, background): “Doidge (2004) finds that while both share classes benefit from a U.S. listing, the minority shareholders benefit proportionately more as the voting premium between share classes narrows.”
One Share - One Vote: The Theory (2007, background): “While the existence of private bene ts is widely documented (e.g., Doidge, 2004; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Nenova, 2003; Zingales, 1995b), this does not imply that resources are allocated less e¢ ciently.”