Taxes and Quotas for a Stock Pollutant with Multiplicative Uncertainty

By M. Hoel, L. Karp. 2001

256 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0b83e3614487c31a49831503c422c7045f835bca

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Dynamic environmental policy with strategic firms: prices versus quantities (2003, methodology): “Following Weitzman’s lead, Newell and Pizer [8] and Hoel and Karp [5] investigated the effect of stock pollutants on the price–quantity question.”
Regulation with Anticipated Learning about Environmental Damages (2006, background): “Several papers, (Hoel and Karp 2001), (Hoel and Karp 2002), and (Newell and Pizer 2003), compare taxes and quotas for the control of stock externalities when firms and the regulator have asymmetric information about abatement costs.”
Regulating Stock Externalities Under Uncertainty (2003, unknown): “Our approach differs from related research by Hoel and Karp [7] [8] in several ways.”
Using a Policy Mix for Pollution Control { A Review of Economic Literature (2012, unknown): “Hoel and Karp (2001) and Newell and Pizer (2003) confirm this finding for a dynamic context where the marginal damage of emissions is a function of the stock of pollutants accumulated over time.”
Managing Permit Markets to Stabilize Prices (2005, background): “…to be very flat due to the stock nature of the externality, thereby strongly favoring the use of price-based instruments (Newell and Pizer 2003; Hoel and Karp 2001).4 We are therefore interested in the potential of tradable permit systems incorporating banking and borrowing to mimic the…”
Optimal climate change mitigation under long-term growth uncertainty: Stochastic integrated assessment and analytic findings (2014, background): “A set of stochastic integrated assessments investigates the impact of short-term fluctuations on the choice of the optimal policy instrument (Hoel & Karp 2001, 2002, Kelly 2005, Karp & Zhang 2006, Heutel 2011, Fischer & Springborn 2011).”
Alternative Approaches to Cost Containment in a Cap-and-Trade System (2010, unknown): “This framework has been extended by Pizer (1999), Hoel and Karp (2001, 2002), and Newell and Pizer (2003) to consider stock externalities (pollutants) accumulating over time.”
Cap and Trade, Rehabilitated: Using Tradable Permits to Control U.S. Greenhouse Gases (2008, methodology): “The quantity instrument modeled by Newell and Pizer (2003) and Hoel and Karp (2001, 2002) is a series of annual quotas that fix allowable emissions in every year.12 In contrast, as noted above, the cap and trade programs proposed in Congress would allow entities to both bank and borrow allowances…”
Prices Versus Quantities Versus Bankable Quantities (2012, background): “4 These results were later extended by Hoel and Karp (2001, 2002) and Newell and Pizer (2003) to consider stock externalities (pollutants).”
COMBINING MULTIPLE CLIMATE POLICY INSTRUMENTS: HOW NOT TO DO IT (2010, unknown): “Despite an ongoing debate about the relative merits of a tax or a permit trading system on its own (for example, Hoel and Karp 2001; Newell and Pizer, 2003; Fell et al, 2008), economists broadly agree that it can be advantageous to combine certain features of both price- and quantity- based…”