Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives

By Barry R. Weingast. 2009

690 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/099505942f5ac62c2bdbc96d3c5037587503f5d4

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Citations in the corpus

The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization: A Survey (2015, positive): “…as well as tradeoffs involving the design of institutions, political incentives and rent seeking, and the generation of information (Weingast, 2009). regarding the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth are due to disparities in the level of effective local autonomy…”
Does fiscal decentralization foster regional investment in productive infrastructure (2013, background): “…taken at central level (amount of transfers received and conditions attached), the resources of the regional government might shift towards rent-seeking activities (lobbying the central government) and away from studying which is the best way to improve the local economy (see Weingast, 2009).”
Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralization: The Case of Russia (2013, background): “Second, in line with the second-generation fiscal federalism literature (Weingast, 2009), our study stresses the crucial role of incentives for local tax collectors, which can be provided by competing governments at the central and the regional levels and thus depend on the balance of power in the…”
Fiscal incentives and policy choices of local governments: Evidence from China (2015, background): “Some scholars have noted that the fiscal incentives of local governments directly influence their policy choices and hence economic performance in their jurisdiction (Careaga and Weingast, 2003; Rodden, 2003; Singh and Srinivasan, 2006; Weingast, 2009).”
Decentralization and Local Governments' Performance: How Does Fiscal Autonomy Affect Spending Efficiency? (2012, neutral): “As Weingast (2009) puts it, «subnational governments that raise a substantial portion of their own revenue – i.e., with a low degree of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance – tend to be more accountable toward the citizens, to provide market-enhancing public goods, and to be less corrupt».”
Tax me, but spend wisely? Sources of public finance and government accountability (2015, background): “21 (20)A related mechanism simply assumes that politicians are budget-maximizing and points out that when the share of taxes in their total budget increases they have more incentives to invest in public infrastructure if they expect these investments to increase their future tax base (Weingast, 2009”
Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: Political Aspects of Decentralization and Economic Development (2014, methodology): “Weingast (2009) focuses on applications of SGFF to fiscal issues.”
Racing to the Bottom or to the Top? Decentralization, Revenue Pressures, and Governance Reform in China (2017, positive): “Initial studies based on aggregate cross-national data suggested that these efforts would likely increase accountability and reduce government waste (Weingast, 2009).”