Accounting for risk aversion in repeated prisoners’ dilemma games: an experimental test

By Gerardo Sabater‐Grande, Nikolaos Georgantzís. 2002

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On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey (2018, background): “Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis [2002] elicit risk preferences by having subjects choose between lotteries and then divide them in three groups based on their risk aversion.”
Personality, Punishment and Public Goods: Strategic Shifts towards Cooperation as a Matter of Dispositional Honesty–Humility (2012, unknown): “…which might predict one’s degree of cooperation (or type) in different social dilemma situations (e.g. Hirsh & Peterson, 2009; Kocher, De Brabander, & van Witteloostuijn, 1999; Kurzban & Houser, 2001; Perugini & De Raad, 2001; Sabater‐Grande & Georgantzis, 2002; Volk, Thöni, & Ruigrok, 2011).”
Infinitely repeated games in the laboratory: four perspectives on discounting and random termination (2016, unknown): “For example, Vespa (2015) studies a dynamic game in which, given the parameters, the cooperative strategy yields higher payoffs than other strategies only for supergames that last more than seven rounds.”