Review: Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness and Understanding Other Minds

By Jane Heal. 2005

314 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0af59198aae014252c7892c1e286c71b8699bf53

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Citations in the corpus

Intuitive theories as grammars for causal inference (2007, background): “…that intuitive theories play essential roles in organizing our most basic knowledge of the world, particularly for causal structures in physical, biological, psychological or social domains (Atran, 1995; Carey, 1985a; Kelley, 1973; McCloskey, 1983; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Nichols & Stich, 2003).”
A new theoretical perspective on deception detection: On the psychology of instrumental mind-reading (2008, background): “Obviously, it is beyond the scope of the present paper to enter these debates (but see Goldman, 2006; Malle & Hodges, 2005; and Nichols & Stich, 2003).”
Reasoning to and from belief: Deduction and induction are still distinct (2013, background): “It in fact works best when it occurs in the context of mostly stable background beliefs it can rely on and appeal to (see Nichols & Stich, 2003, Chapter 2 on pretence, and Evans & Over, 2004, Chapter 7 on counterfactuals).”
The nature of epistemic feelings (2014, background): “However, researchers studying metacognition, control systems, and cognitive architecture seem to agree that it may be the case that there is a set of mechanisms rather than a single mechanism that controls all cognitive processes (Carver, 2003; Evans, 2008; Nichols & Stich, 2003; Thompson, 2009).”
Reasoning about reasoning by nested conditioning: Modeling theory of mind with probabilistic programs (2014, background): “Specialized mental modules—such as a “belief box” and a “desire box” [24]—might arise simply as a consequence of an agent’s attempt to explain her observations in a parsimonious way, or might not turn out to be necessary to explain our cognitive capabilities in the first place.”
Natural myside bias is independent of cognitive ability (2007, background): “…cognitive abilities have different levels of computational power available for the override operations that make decoupling possible (Carruthers, 2002; Dienes & Perner, 1999; Evans & Over, 2004; Geary, 2005; Nichols & Stich, 2003; Perner, 1991; Stanovich, 1999, 2004; Stanovich & West, 2000).”