Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

By D. Hollanders. 2008

535 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0a5817b0c2d7953f03dfa606c44d705d874ac9a2

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Citations in the corpus

Political Economy of Public Policies: Insights from Distortions to Agricultural and Food Markets (2013, unknown): “…the past fifteen years (that is, since the most recent citations in Binswanger and Deininger). on political economy of trade policies: work by Acemoglu and Robinson (2001, 2006) on the interactions between institutions and policy making; applications of Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) model of…”
Is Democracy Good for the Poor (2006, background): “Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) also build on the Meltzer-Richard framework and explore the conditions under which states transit from authoritarian to democratic rule; like both Meltzer and Richard and Boix, they suggest that authoritarian governments favor the interests of the elite and no redistribu”
Identity, Inequality, and Happiness: Evidence from Urban China (2012, background): “3 It is also considered as a more influential element than “vertical inequality” (e.g., the Gini income coefficient) in determining social conflict and long-term growth (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Stewart, 2002; Stewart, Brown, & Mancini, 2005; Stewart & Langer, 2007).”
Religion, Politics, and Development: Lessons from the Lands of Islam (2008, background): “The importance of religious beliefs is, therefore, the answer to Acemoglu and Robinson’s question as to why do institutions–in this case, religious institutions–provide commitment (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, p. 177-79).”
Comparing theories of institutional change (2009, background): “For example, voting, protesting, joining political associations, and even learning about the impact of potential policies may all be individually non-rational actions, even if the individual cares deeply about the result.”
Self-Enforcing Democracy (2006, background): “Elections are always taken as a given, a part of the structure of interactions being analyzed.”
Workers of the World, Unite! Franchise Extensions and the Threat of Revolution in Europe, 1820-1938 (2014, background): “The ‘threat of revolution hypothesis’suggests that the elite offers voting rights to avoid revolution (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2006).1 They do so whenever they perceive the risk to be suffi ciently real.”
Democratisation and Growth (2008, background): “Although there is a strong association between income and democracy, this correlation almost vanishes in differences (Acemoglu et al., 2006).”
Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence From the Great Reform Act of 1832 (2015, unknown): “(2000), Acemoglu et al. (2008), Barro (1999), and Gundlach and Paldam (2009).”