Implicature, explicature and truth-theoretic semantics
By Robyn Carston. 1998
Subfields: Linguistics, Philosophy
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Linguistics
- Roger Levy
- Noah D. Goodman
- Dan Sperber
- Anna Papafragou
- Leon Bergen
- Deirdre Wilson
- Julien Musolino
- Jennifer Saul
In Philosophy
- Roger Levy
- Noah D. Goodman
- Dan Sperber
- Anna Papafragou
- Leon Bergen
- Deirdre Wilson
- Julien Musolino
- Jennifer Saul
Citations in the corpus
- Scalar implicatures: experiments at the semantics-pragmatics interface. (2003, background): “There is also much important (and related) discussion about whether the derivation of scalar inference relies mostly on (broadly Gricean) informativeness considerations (Horn, 1972; Levinson, 2000), or a post-Gricean relevance-based mechanism ( Carston, 1998, 1988; Sperber & Wilson, 1995).”
- The co-constitution of politeness implicature in conversation (2007, unknown): “The closely related test of cancellability has also been found to be a necessary but not sufficient characteristic for indentifying an implicature, since any meaning that is derived inferentially can only arise in particular contexts, and thus can be cancelled (Carston, 1988, 2002).”
- Indicators and procedures: nevertheless and but (2000, background): “Within the Relevance theoretic approach to communication developed by Sperber & Wilson (1995) it has been argued that there is a gap between linguistic meaning and the truth conditional content of the assumption explicitly communicated (see in particular, Carston 1988 ), and hence that the linguist”
- Pragmatic reasoning through semantic inference (2016, background): “Consider the following examples, slightly modified by Carston (1988):”
- What Is Said And Psychological Reality; Grice's Project And Relevance Theorists' Criticisms (2002, background): “…standard Gricean distinction between what is said and what is implicated turn, broadly, on the claim that the principles commonly used to draw this distinction are not “appropriate principle[s] for a PSYCHOLOGICALLY plausible theory of utterance interpretation” (Carston 1991: 39 – her emphasis).”
- Truthfulness and Relevance (2002, background): “…checking whether the item falls within the scope of logical operators when embedded into a negative or conditional sentence: explicatures fall within the scope of negation and other logical operators, while implicatures do not (Carston 1988; Recanati 1989; Wilson and Sperber 1998; Ifantidou 2001).”