How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?

By Gary Charness, Guillaume R. Fréchette, John H. Kagel. 2002

218 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/099a05f77f47de27e09dad1fedb09b644e022332

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Citations in the corpus

Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students (2004, unknown): “7 This is evocative of the result found by Charness et al. (2004), that”
Intention and Stochastic Outcomes: An Experimental Study (2007, background): “…in relative payoffs; the Fehr 13 In some experiments with 10 or more multiple periods and anonymous matching (Brandts and Charness, 2003; Charness et al., 2004; Charness and Kuhn, forthcoming), worker behaviour unravels in the last couple of periods, suggesting that workers choose…”
The hidden advantage of delegation: pareto-improvements in a gift-exchange game (2012, background): “…payment modes with reciprocity; Kocher and Sutter (2007) analyze how groups behave in the gift exchange game and the role of communication; Charness et al. (2004) find that the degree of gift exchange is surprisingly sensitive to an apparently innocuous change - whether or not a…”
A Behavioral Account of the Labor Market: The Role of Fairness Concerns (2008, result): “The finding that the impact of fairness alone on market performance is positive but small is very robust and has also been confirmed in a number of other laboratory studies using students as participants (Charness 2004; Charness et al 2004; Falk & Gaechter 2002; Fehr et al 1993; Hannan et al 2002).”
On the Economics and Biology of Trust (2009, background): “The literature on gift exchange games (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl 1993; Brandts and Charness 2004; Charness 2004; Charness, Frechette, and Kagel 2004) and the more recent papers on the counterproductive effects of sanctions and other measures that constrain agents’ shirking (Bohnet, Frey, and…”
Session-effects in the laboratory (2011, unknown): “dom re-matching in fixed subgroups of a session such as in Charness et al. (2007) and Apesteguia et al.”
Lab Labor: What can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab? (2010, unknown): “Agents’ tournament-induced preferences for risk have been studied in various field contexts, including stock car racing --Becker and Huselid (1992) show that drivers take more risks when the prize spread is large--, and investment fund managers (Brown et al, 1996); Chevalier and Ellison (1997). Brow”