The macroeconomics of child labor regulation

By Matthias Doepke, Fabrizio Zilibotti. 2005

250 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We develop a positive theory of the adoption of child labor laws. Workers who compete with children in the labor market support a child labor ban, unless their own working children provide a large fraction of family income. Fertility decisions lock agents into specific political preferences, and multiple steady states can arise. The introduction of child labor laws can be triggered by skill-biased technological change, which induces parents to choose smaller families. The theory can account for the observation that, in Britain, regulations were first introduced after a period of rising wage inequality, and coincided with rapid fertility decline.

Subfields: Gender Studies, Safety Research, Soil Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/086b678fd88aec853a8ce9ed538d5a7f4de53057

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Gender Studies

  1. Oded Galor
  2. Norbert R. Schady
  3. Michael Bar
  4. Omer Moav
  5. Eric V. Edmonds
  6. Oksana Leukhina

In Safety Research

  1. Norbert R. Schady
  2. Eric V. Edmonds
  3. Oded Galor
  4. Omer Moav
  5. Sarah Baird
  6. Frederico Finan
  7. Renos Vakis
  8. A. de Janvry

In Soil Science

  1. Norbert R. Schady
  2. Oded Galor
  3. Omer Moav
  4. Eric V. Edmonds
  5. Claus C. Prtner
  6. Mette Ejrns

Citations in the corpus