Judging probable cause.

By H. J. Einhorn, Robin M. Hogarth. 1986

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Citations in the corpus

Explanation in Human-AI Systems: A Literature Meta-Review, Synopsis of Key Ideas and Publications, and Bibliography for Explainable AI (2019, background): “Hypothesis: Explanations are good if they make sense in terms of the context or the enabling conditions of cause-effect relations (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986; Hilton and Erb, 1996).”
Everyday magical powers: the role of apparent mental causation in the overestimation of personal influence. (2006, background): “People infer that a particular physical event has caused an effect if it appears closely prior to the effect, is consistent with the effect, and appears exclusive of alternative causes of the effect (Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Michotte, 1946/1963).”
Counterfactual thinking and ascriptions of cause and preventability. (1996, background): “Over the past decade, many researchers (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Hilton, 1990; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Lipe, 1991; McGilI, 1989, 1990; McGill & Klein, 1993; Roese & Olson, 1995a; Wells & Gavanski, 1989) have posited that causal ascriptions depend in a significant way on counterfactual thinking .”
The correspondence of family features with problem, aggressive, criminal, and violent behavior: a meta-analysis (2010, background): “We emphasize “maximum” and “might” because correlation coefficients are only one of the necessary conditions for presuming cause, alone it is not sufficient for inferring cause (e.g., Einhorn and Hogarth 1986; White 1990).”
What Scientific Thinking Reveals About the Nature of Cognition (2000, background): “…and an effect occurring or not occurring, it has been demonstrated repeatedly that people focus on the joint presence of the cause and the effect and do not consider situations where the effect does not occur and the cause is present (Ahn & Bailenson, 1996; Cheng 1999; Einhorn & Hogarth 1986).”
Effect of Counterfactual and Factual Thinking on Causal Judgments (2003, background): “…that build on Mackie (1974) posit that counterfactual conditionals can act as tests of the necessary (or “but for”) causes of outcomes that demand explanation (e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Lipe, 1991; McGill & Klein, 1993; Roese & Olson, 1997; Wells & Gavanski, 1989).”
Spontaneous counterfactual thoughts and causal explanations (2006, background): “Counterfactual thoughts may be one part of a more complex causal judgement process (e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Hilton, 1990; McGill & Klein, 1993).”