MARKET DISCIPLINE AND DEPOSIT INSURANCE

By Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Harry Huizinga. 2004

674 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/07fa6af68162c62a2a45fe26ae3e22b4c5a2405e

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Citations in the corpus

How bank capital buffers vary across countries: the influence of cost of deposits, market power and bank regulation (2010, background): “We follow Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) to measure the cost of deposits, defined as the ratio of interest expense to interest- 4 Ayuso et al. (2004), Stoltz and Wedow (2005), and Jokipii and Milne (2008) also use this estimator to analyze the cyclical behavior of capital buffers. bearing debt…”
The impact of state ownership on performance differences in privately-owned versus state-owned banks: An international comparison (2010, neutral): “Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) document that, on average, BankScope covers about 90% of all bank assets for most”
Bank Competition and Stability: Cross-country Heterogeneity (2013, background): “Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma (2010), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Laeven and Levine (2009) and many others). The Z-score measures the distance from insolvency (Roy (1952)) and is calculated as Zi;t = ROAi;t + (E=A)i;t (ROA)i;t (7) whereROA is return on assets, E=A denotes the equity to asset rati”
Corporate Governance: What’s Special About Banks? (2013, background): “By reducing incentives of depositors to monitor banks, deposit insurance may displace market discipline by the bank’s creditors, potentially hindering corporate governance (Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga 2004).”
Political Institutions and Bank Risk-Taking Behavior (2015, positive): “This result is consistent with the line of research which suggests that deposit insurance reduces depositors’ discipline on banks and generates moral hazard problems encouraging banks to take higher risks (Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga 2004).”
The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis (2008, positive): “And it is a serious disadvantage as experience in the USA during the S&L crisis and empirical studies from the World Bank have clearly shown, see Demirgüç-Kunt and 3 Detragiache (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004), and Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002).”
Market discipline, financial crisis and regulatory changes: Evidence from Indonesian banks (2011, methodology): “The second group examines not only the relation between bank risk and the amount of uninsured deposits, but also the relation between bank risk and the interest rate paid to depositors (Park, 1995; Park and Peristiani, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; MartínezPeria and Schmukler, 2001; Hosono”
Finance, Financial Sector Policies, and Long-Run Growth (2008, background): “…higher financial fragility, and lower financial development – in countries where complementary institutions are not strong enough to keep these costs under control (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Cull, Senbet and Sorge, 2005).”
Deposit Insurance Database (2014, background): “Concerns about moral hazard led to policy recommendations for low coverage-to-income limits, coinsurance schemes, and the exclusion of wholesale deposits (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002, and Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004).”