Which Properties are Represented in Perception
By S. Siegel. 2006
430 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Social Psychology
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/07b43e2904a039699a0636d4f7c250a140259180
How researchers see this paper
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In Social Psychology
Citations in the corpus
- Cognitive Penetrability of Perception (2013, background): “16 See Siewert 1998 and Siegel 2006 for defenders of the high-level view.”
- Perceptual content and the content of mental imagery (2015, background): “A couple of quick examples: it has been argued that we perceive objects as trees and tables (Siegel 2006), as being causally efficacious (Siegel 2005, 2009), as edible, climbable or Q-able in general (Nanay 2011a, 2012a), as agents (Scholl andTremoullet 2000), as having somekindof normative…”
- Speech Perception (2004, background): “They argue therefore that listening to spoken utterances when you know the language involves perceptually experiencing meanings or semantic properties (e.g., McDowell, 1998; Siegel, 2006; Bayne, 2009).”
- ATTENTION AND MENTAL PAINT (2010, background): “Philosophers have been interested in the question of whether vision represents only properties like shape , size , contrast , color and texture ( Prinz , 2006 ) or whether vision also repesents " high level " properties such as facial expression , causation or number ( Siegel , 2006 ) .”
- Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception (2009, background): “For some recent assessments, see Prinz 2005, 2009; Siegel 2006; Heck 2007; and Byrne 2009.”
- The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience (2013, neutral): “ Self-‐representational contents of various sorts are defended by Searle (1983), Chalmers (2004), Kriegel (2009), Siegel (2006).”
- Varieties of cognitive penetration in visual perception. (2014, neutral): “Regarding the question on whether cognitive penetration is a causal (Siegel, 2005) or a rational (Pylyshyn, 1999) relation, we take the side of Siegel and argue that it is sufficient if there is a causal relation between a higher cognitive state and the percept that is influenced by it.”