The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games

By Michael R. Baye, Heidrun C. Hoppe. Games Econ. Behav., 2003

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Quitters Never Win: The (Adverse) Incentive Effects of Competing with Superstars (2011, result): “The result in (2) indicates that larger di¤erences in playersabilities will lead to lower equilibrium e¤ort from both players and is consistent with the more general two-player results in Leininger (1993) and Baik (1994).”
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments (2014, background): “Contests with endogenous prizes are especially interesting because theoretically they can generate qualitatively different predictions than contests with exogenous prizes (Chung 1996; Baye and Hoppe 2003; Long and Vousden 1987; Chowdhury and Sheremeta 2011a, b, 2014; Baye et al. 2012). For instance,”
Strategy in contests: an introduction [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung] (2007, neutral): “F b 1 (x1) = x1 a for x1 2 [0; aqa) qa(1 ab ) + x1 b for x1 2 [qaa; qaa+ qbb]: (26)”