The Structure of Bank Relationships, Endogenous Monitoring and Loan Rates

By Elena Carletti. 2001

180 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/06a96539db0e75bc8b24cc916aab9a87f6a4186d

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. P. Martínez‐Solano
2. Ginés Hernández-Cánovas
3. Elena Carletti
4. Franklin Allen

In Finance

1. P. Martínez‐Solano
2. Ginés Hernández-Cánovas
3. Elena Carletti
4. Franklin Allen

Citations in the corpus

• Taxes and Bank Capital Structure (2016, unknown): “Additionally, the idea of diminishing returns to the screening and monitoring of borrowers is also in line with the assumption of a convex cost function of bank monitoring, as for example assumed by Besanko and Kanatas (1993) and Carletti (2004).”
• Creditor Concentration: An Empirical Investigation (2012, unknown): “On the other hand, this finding also contradicts with the prediction by Carletti, Cerasi and Daltung (2005).”
• CHAPTER 14 – Competition and Regulation in Banking (2008, methodology): “To illustrate the agency problem between banks and depositors, we use a simple model adapted from Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Cerasi and Daltung (2000) and Carletti (2004).”
• Multiple-bank lending: diversification and free-riding in monitoring (2004, unknown): “These include firms’ desire to mitigate the hold up and the overmonitoring problems as well as the liquidity risk affecting exclusive bank-firm relationships (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Von Thadden, 1992; Detragiache et al., 2000; and Carletti, 2004).”
• Bank ownership type and banking relationships (2006, unknown): “Prior research illustrates how decisions on multiple relationships may also depend on the costs and benefits of bank monitoring by multiple banks (e.g., Carletti, 2004).”
• Relationship lending and SME financing in the continental European bank-based system (2010, background): “ Carletti (2004) states that a bank monitors a firm more closely when it is the sole lender than when it finances the firm with another bank, because the presence of two lenders involves duplication of effort and sharing of monitoring benefits.”
• Staying, Dropping, or Switching: The Impacts of Bank Mergers on Small Firms (2009, unknown): “Carletti 2004; Detragiache, Garella and Guiso 2000) on the optimal number of relationships). Second, by combining information from all of the merging banks, mergers may also improve the merged bank’s information about borrowers.19 Our results in panel A of Table 2 show that overlap borrowers (ACQTAR”