A Clash of Governance Logics: Foreign Ownership and Board Monitoring

By K. Desender, Ruth V. Aguilera, Mónica LópezPuertas‐Lamy, R. Crespí. 2016

182 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

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Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance under Stakeholder-Oriented Corporate Governance (2020, background): “In fact, the increase in foreign investors’ holdings in Japanese firms grew from less than 5% in 1990 to 28% in 2012 [17].”
Change above the Glass Ceiling: Corporate Social Responsibility and Gender Diversity in Japanese Firms (2018, background): “Foreign actors have been considered as change agents who may introduce new logics and push local firms to reform traditional practices (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005; Desender et al., 2016; Jung and Mun, 2016).”
Global corporate governance: On the relevance of firms’ ownership structure (2016, background): “developed countries such as Japan (Desender et al., 2014), where board monitoring is only activated when shareholder-oriented foreign ownership is high and the influence of foreign ownership is especially strong in firms without large domestic owners.”
Public Governance, Corporate Governance, and Firm Innovation: An Examination of State-Owned Enterprises (2019, unknown): “…practices determine managerial agency risk in modern firms: (1) the use of governance tools to align the private incentives of agents more closely with firm value and (2) the use of monitoring by owners (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; He & Wang, 2009; Desender et al., 2016; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014).”