Coalitional Politics and Logrolling in Legislative Institutions

By Clifford J. Carrubba, C. Volden. 2000

147 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/065dc23bc01e8a03e648d2bdbad987589e5f1847

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. R. Holcombe
2. C. Volden
3. Alan E. Wiseman
4. Barry R. Weingast

In Political Science and International Relations

1. R. Holcombe
2. C. Volden
3. Alan E. Wiseman
4. Barry R. Weingast

In Safety Research

1. R. Holcombe

Citations in the corpus

• Bargaining in Legislatures over Particularistic and Collective Goods (2007, background): “For particularistic benefits, Carrubba and Volden (2000) predict oversized coalitions when the number of legislators is large or legislators are impatient.”
• Political Entrepreneurship and the Democratic Allocation of Economic Resources (2002, background): “Thus, Groseclose and Snyder (1996) argue that it is cheaper to form a larger coalition to prevent such defections, which Carrubba and Volden (2000) refer to as the minimum necessary coalition.”