The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements and Mandatory Adoption of IFRS

By Wayne R. Landsman, Edward L. Maydew, Jacob R. Thornock. 2012

657 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d645b17666bc77230d65cc9fc7fc3b820ea05bbb

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Citations in the corpus

Does Mandatory IFRS Adoption Affect Crash Risk (2015, positive): “These findings complement prior international studies that examine the importance of institutional arrangements on the economic consequences of financial reporting regulations (Li, 2010; Byard et al., 2011; DeFond et al., 2011; Landsman et al., 2012).”
Dividend Payouts and Information Shocks (2014, background): “…IFRS adoption is associated with capital-market benefits, improvements of accounting properties, and positive effects on analysts’ ability to forecast future earnings for at least some firms in the economy (e.g., Daske et al. 2008; Byard, Li, and Yu 2011; Landsman, Maydew, and Thornock 2012).”
Accounting Standards and International Portfolio Holdings (2014, positive): “Consistent with this, Landsman et al. (2012) find that IFRS adoption leads to increased capital market 10 consequences in the form of a greater price and volume reaction to a firm’s earnings announcement.”
A review of the IFRS adoption literature (2016, background): “Landsman et al. (2012) measure information content as either abnormal return volatility or abnormal trading volume.”
Mandatory IFRS Reporting and Changes in Enforcement (2013, background): “Landsman et al. (2012) show that the increase in information content of earnings announcements after IFRS adoption depends on the strength of countries’ legal systems.”
Societal Trust and Management Earnings Forecasts (2020, background): “…earnings Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3535172 27 credibility.21 Moreover, recent studies suggest that IFRS represent high-quality accounting standards and can increase earnings quality of firms that adopt these standards (e.g., Barth et al. 2008; Landsman et al. 2012).”
When Firms Talk, Do Investors Listen? The Role of Trust in Stock Market Reactions to Corporate Earnings Announcements (2012, methodology): “…financial disclosure (e.g., Alford et al. (1993), Ali and Hwang (2000), Hung (2000), Landsman and Maydew (2002), DeFond, Hung, and Trezevant (2007), Landsman, Maydew, and Thornock (2012)), research has been scarce on whether cultural dimensions at the country level influence investors’…”
Admitting Mistakes: Home Country Effect on the Reliability of Restatement Reporting (2015, background): “25 Prior research finds that IFRS adoption is associated with higher reporting quality (Barth et al. 2008; Landsman et al. 2012) and a significant reduction in information asymmetry (e.”
The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research (2015, background): “Most of these studies document insignificant or even adverse changes in reporting properties following IFRS adoption (see, e.g., Capkun et al., 2012; Ahmed et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 2015; but see also Landsman et al., 2012).”
Mandatory IFRS adoption: the trade-off between accrual-based and real earnings management (2017, background): “Landsman et al. (2012) report an increase in the informational content of earnings for mandatory adopters.”
Mandatory IFRS Adoption and the Contractual Usefulness of Accounting Information in Executive Compensation (2012, neutral): “[2011], Lang et al.[2010]).”
Measuring Country Differences in Enforcement of Accounting Standards: An Audit and Enforcement Proxy (2013, neutral): “Leuz et al. (2003) propose that investor protection is a significant determinant of variation in earnings management practices (defined as per Healy and Wahlen, 1999 as the alteration of firms’ reported economic performance by insiders either to mislead some stakeholders or to influence contractual ”