Board Monitoring and Earnings Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals?

By K. Peasnell, P. Pope, S. Young. 2005

1,361 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/05763c56672580c0df5fe54bfc74aef9e205a6dd

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Citations in the corpus

Board Committees, CEO Compensation, and Earnings Management (2009, neutral): “While Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) and Beasley et al. (2000) find a positive association between audit committee presence and financial reporting quality, Beasley (1996) and Peasnell, Pope, and Young (2005) find no such relation.”
THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS (2006, background): “While Peasnell et al (2000) do not find evidence to substantiate that audit committees directly constrain earnings management, they nevertheless determine from their finding of a significant negative co-efficient on the interaction term between outside directors and the presence of an audit…”
The influence of board independence, competency and ownership on earnings management in Malaysia (2009, methodology): “Previous studies provide evidence that board’s independence, competency and management ownership are effective mechanisms in monitoring the management (Beasley, 1996; Chtourou et al. 2001; Bowen et al. 2002; Xie et al. 2003; Peasnell et al. 2005; and Peasnell et al. 2006).”
Accounting conservatism and corporate governance (2009, background): “Research on corporate governance has found that firms with weak governance structures engage in more earnings manipulation, that is, they have lower quality earnings and accruals (for example Dechow et al. 1996; Becker et al. 1998; Klein 2002; Peasnell et al. 2005).”
Ownership structure, corporate governance, and fraud: Evidence from China (2006, background): “Peasnell et al. (2005) find that firms with a high proportion of outsiders on the board are less likely to engage in opportunistic earnings management.”
External Auditors, Audit Committees and Earnings Management in France (2007, background): “Notes 1See, for instance, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1993), Dechow et al. (1996), Becker et al. (1998), Francis et al. (1999), Peasnell et al. (2000a), Frankel et al. (2002), Klein (2002a), Kim et al. (2003), Xie et al. (2003) and Bédard et al. (2004).”
The Monitoring Role of Female Directors Over Accounting Quality (2017, background): “We find that firms with a larger percentage of women among independent directors show 3 See, e.g., Armstrong et al. (2014), Beekes et al. (2004), García Lara et al. (2009), Klein (2002), Peasnell et al. (2005), and Xie et al. (2003). improved accounting numbers.”