Essentialist Beliefs About Mental Disorders

By Nick Haslam, D. Ernst. 2002

202 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Developmental and Educational Psychology, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/04d614ef0f4bb24d84f1571bc4252ac642e5ddb5

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Citations in the corpus

The explanatory effect of a label: Explanations with named categories are more satisfying. (2017, background): “For the domain of mental disorders, additional evidence supports the idea that construing a category in more scientific or reductive terms could affect the way it is conceptualized (Ahn, Proctor, & Flanagan, 2009; Haslam & Ernst, 2002).”
Psychological Essentialism, Implicit Theories, and Intergroup Relations (2006, background): “Haslam and Ernst (2002) investigated essentialist beliefs about mental disorders, adapting a methodology developed by Chiu, Hong, and Dweck (1997).”
Kinds of Kinds: A Conceptual Taxonomy of Psychiatric Categories (2002, background): “Such thinking is surely brought to bear much too 9.3haslam01 6/24/03, 2:44 PM213 indiscriminately in the psychiatric domain, by professionals and laypeople alike (Haslam, 2000; Haslam and Ernst, 2002), but it should not be entirely ruled out.”
Dimensions of Folk Psychiatry (2005, background): “Perceived personal vulnerability and unpredictability may also rest on essentialist thinking, given Keil et al.’s (1999) claim that mental disorder is sometimes implicitly understood to be contaminating and Gelman and Hirschfeld’s (1999, p.”
Psychological essentialism and stereotype endorsement (2006, background): “…such as race (Hirschfeld, 1996), ethnicity (Gil-White, 2001; Verkuyten, 2003), gender (Mahalingam, 2003), sexual orientation (Haslam & Levy, in press), and mental disorder (Haslam & Ernst, 2002), as well as in connection with personality attributes (Giles, 2003; Haslam, Bastian, & Bissett, 2004).”
Self-esteem and multiculturalism: An examination among ethnic minority and majority groups in the Netherlands (2009, result): “Research on lay theories has shown that studies that experimentally activate theories provide similar findings as when the endorsement of lay theories are measured by self-report (e.g., Haslam & Ernst, 2002; Levy, West, Ramirez, & Karafantis, 2006; Plaks, Stroessner, Dweck, & Sherman, 2000).”
Evaluating the Domain Specificity of Mental Health–Related Mind-Sets (2016, background): “Research also suggests that genetic or neurobiological conceptions of mental health—which are becoming increasingly popular—carry unintentional negative consequences (Deacon, 2013; Haslam & Ernst, 2002; Kvaale, Haslam, & Gottdiener, 2013).”
The Multidimensional Nature of Psychopathy: Five Recommendations for Research (2018, background): “Philosophers of psychiatry have further observed that most of us tend to conceptualize mental disorders in essentialist terms, presuming them to be distinct entities (Bnatural kinds^) even when they are not (Haslam and Ernst 2002).”
Biogenetic Explanations of Mental Disorder (2015, background): “Social psychologists have explored its bearing on conceptions of gender, race, sexuality, and mental disorder (e.g., Haslam & Ernst, 2002).”
Determinants of Gender Essentialism in College Students (2008, background): “Essentialist reasoning has been found in the USA among both children (Gelman 2003; Giles 2003; Heyman and Gelman 2000; Hirschfeld 1996; Taylor 1996) and adults (Ahn et al. 2006; Atran 1998; Haslam 1998; Haslam and Ernst 2002; Haslam et al. 2000; Rehder 2007), and in other cultural contexts as well (”
Comorbidity: A network perspective (2010, background): “…between the two main diagnostic categories “disorder” and “no disorder” that are based on diagnostic criteria and the real world (e.g., see Haslam 2000; Haslam & Ernst 2002; Lilienfeld & Marino 1999): The diagnostic criteria we use result in a distinction between disordered and non-disordered…”
Lay Theories and Intergroup Relations (2006, background): “However, studies in which people’s lay theories are temporarily induced provide similar findings as when the lay theories are simply measured by self-report (e.g. Chiu, Hong et al., 1997; Haslam & Ernst, 2002; Levy et al., 1998, 2006; Plaks et al., 2000).”