Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from China

By Katharina Pistor, Chenggang Xu. 2005

298 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/04872862d90afef2eb8b8a6ccec71dabb8d70075

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Xing-qiang Du
2. Qiao Liu
3. Zhou Lu
4. T. Wong
5. Chongfeng Wu
6. Zhengwei Wang
7. Jun Wu
8. Weiqiang Zhang

In Finance

1. Xing-qiang Du
2. Zhou Lu
3. T. Wong
4. Chongfeng Wu
5. Jun Wu
6. Xiaowei Rose Luo
7. Jing Jian Xiao
8. Chunyang Zhou

Citations in the corpus

• Corporate Environmental Responsibility in Polluting Industries: Does Religion Matter? (2013, unknown): “Finally, as previous studies argue, informal system can serve as an alternative to formal legal and regulatory systems (Allen et al. 2005; Du 2012; Pistor and Xu 2005).”
• The Effect of China's Weak Institutional Environment on the Quality of Big 4 Audits (2015, unknown): “Indeed, Pistor and Xu (2005) find that legal enforcement has played only a minor role in China's economic development.”
• Financial Literacy, Portfolio Choice and Financial Well-Being (2016, background): “However, China has only slowly developed a legal framework for stock markets and has a weak law enforcement record, which played at best a marginal role in China’s market development (Pistor & Xu 2005).”
• Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspective ☆ (2007, background): “6 The regional decentralization is believed to promote competition among different regions (Pistor and Xu, 2005). 884 Q. Liu, Z. Lu / Journal of Corporate Finance 13 (2007) 881–906 中国科技论文在线 http://www.”
• Does Religion Mitigate Tunneling? Evidence from Chinese Buddhism (2014, background): “Williamson (2000), Aggarwal and Goodell (2009), Allen et al. (2005), and Pistor and Xu (2005) argue that informal institutions may have important impacts on formal systems like the law.”
• Political connections, tax benefits and firm performance: Evidence from China (2012, methodology): “This IPO quota system led to the better-performing SOEs being selected for IPOs during the startup period of the stock market, prior to the development of corporate governance mechanisms and legal institutions for investor protection (Pistor and Xu, 2005).”
• Reputational Sanctions in China's Securities Market (2007, unknown): “23 April 2007 (Monday) Room 425, 4/F KK Leung Building 1:00 – 2:00 p.m.”
• Corporate Governance Research on Listed Firms in China: Institutions, Governance and Accountability (2016, background): “In many cases, the courts refuse to issue their interpretations and avoid taking responsibility for judgments that involve SOEs and the government [Pistor and Xu, 2005b].”
• Institutional open access at home and outward internationalization (2015, unknown): “Firms are not allowed to go public without the approval by the provincial government (Pistor & Xu, 2005).”
• Does Religion Matter to Owner-Manager Agency Costs? Evidence from China (2012, background): “Allen et al. (2005) and Pistor and Xu (2005) note that informal system, as an alternative mechanism, may work in emerging markets where formal sys-tem is under construction.”