Political connections, tax benefits and firm performance: Evidence from China

By Wenfeng Wu, Chongfeng Wu, Chunyang Zhou, Jun Wu. 2012

577 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d8232f8062c51a6fa7b2537f8cfac2a17747ca02

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Sofia Johan
2. Wenfeng Wu
3. Kam C. Chan
4. Oliver M. Rui
5. Qinyuan Chen
6. Chenying Zhang
7. Haitian Lu
8. Nianhang Xu

In Strategy and Management

1. Qinyuan Chen
2. Peng Zhou
3. Chenying Zhang
4. Sofia Johan
5. Kam C. Chan
6. Nianhang Xu
7. Yan Xu
8. Wenfeng Wu

Citations in the corpus

• Institutional Investors, Political Connections, and the Incidence of Regulatory Enforcement Against Corporate Fraud (2014, background): “Wu et al. (2012a) argue that compared with politically connected managers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), politically connected managers in non-SOEs play a more significant role in helping firms to gain privileges or favorable treatment from the government.”
• Innovative Finance, Technological Adaptation and SMEs Sustainability: The Mediating Role of Government Support during COVID-19 Pandemic (2021, background): “[98], SMEs’ success in developing countries relies on political and government relationships, and a business can achieve long-term output.”
• Political uncertainty and cash holdings: Evidence from China (2016, methodology): “Wu et al. (2012) report that politically connected SOEs over-invest to please politicians.”
• Political connections, government subsidies and firm financial performance: Evidence from renewable energy manufacturing in China (2014, background): “Versions of ROA frequently found in the literature include return on total assets [2,3,5,6,13,16], return on total core assets [13], return on net assets [5,8] and return on total net worth [8].”
• Political activity and firm performance within nonmarket research: A review and international comparative assessment (2015, unknown): “In China where the government controls many aspects of the stock market (Francis et al., 2009) and allocates resources (Peng & Luo, 2000), there is incentive for preferential treatment to be accorded to politically connected firms (Wu et al., 2012; Yeh et al., 2013).”
• Family Firm Research – A Review (2014, unknown): “Wu et al. (2012) also show that family firms with politically connected managers enjoy tax benefits and outperform those without such managers.”
• Political Connectedness and Court Outcomes: Evidence from Chinese Corporate Lawsuits (2015, background): “…Other literature, however, shows that there is a political cost (Lin and Li 2008) and finds that connected firms underperform because of distorted managerial incentives (Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar 2008), decreased professionalism (Fan, Wong, and Zhang 2007), or overinvestment (Wu et al. 2012).”
• Do Political Connections Buffer Firms from or Bind Firms to the Government? A Study of Corporate Charitable Donations of Chinese Firms (2016, unknown): “The political appointments better enable the corporate elites to communicate and negotiate with the government on important policies affecting their business such as entry permit, tax benefits, preferential financing, etc. (Dickson 2003, Li et al. 2008, Wu et al. 2012).”