How foreign firms curtail local supplier opportunism in China: Detailed contracts, centralized control, and relational governance

By Kevin Zheng Zhou, Dean Xu. 2012

280 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/043af97831c1ab7ae6c53de0e1b9f63aa04eca02

Citations in the corpus

• Governing Interfirm Relationships for Social Sustainability: The Relationship between Governance Mechanisms, Sustainable Collaboration, and Cultural Intelligence (2018, unknown): “These findings further extend past research examining contract effectiveness in an emerging country [87].”
• LINKING THEORY AND CONTEXT: "STRATEGY RESEARCH IN EMERGING ECONOMIES" AFTER WRIGHT ET AL. (2005) (2012, unknown): “Particularly, in the absence of market-supporting institutions, firms face “institutional voids” (Khanna and Palepu, 1997), and thus respond by developing strategies to avoid inefficient markets or create substitutes for formal institutional support (Xin and Pearce, 1996; Zhou and Xu, 2012).”
• Blockchain Governance—A New Way of Organizing Collaborations? (2020, unknown): “Thus, the effectiveness of using contracts to govern collaborations depends heavily on the quality of the country ’ s legal system (Oxley 1999, Zhou and Xu 2012).”