Entrepreneurial moral hazard and bank monitoring: A model of the credit channel
By Rafael Repullo, Javier Suárez. 2000
185 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/03f51dcab25b0aa0c320b68d9dc50dcde89c0afe
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Citations in the corpus
- Corporate Finance and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism (2006, result): “Because our model allows for the coexistence of bank lending and securities markets, it is also related to a third set of articles by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Repullo and Suarez (2000) , and Bolton and Freixas (2000), which all characterize equilibria where bank lending and direct financing thr”
- Multiple-bank lending: diversification and free-riding in monitoring (2004, unknown): “17The negative effect of a tighter monetary policy on banks’ monitoring incentives and overall lending is already discussed in the literature (see, e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Repullo and Suarez, 2000; Chiesa, 2001; and Almazan, 2002).”
- Access to external finance: Theory and evidence on the impact of monetary policy and firm-specific characteristics (2006, background): “(1993), Boot and Thakor (1997), Diamond (1991), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Hoshi et al. (1993) and Repullo and Suarez (2000) .”
- Addressing barriers to eco-innovation: Exploring the finance mobilisation functions of institutional innovation intermediaries (2016, background): “This form of intermediary complements informed investors (which to some extent may also be considered intermediaries) such as VCs (Leete et al., 2013; Da Rin et al., 2006; Repullo and Suarez, 2000), as they are capable of reducing uncertainty and risk.”
- Trade Credit, Bank Lending and Monetary Policy Transmission (2003, background): “For example theoretical research has been developed to allow bank lending and a capital market to co-exist even though the former is more expensive (see Diamond, 1991; Besanko and Kanatas, 1993; Hoshi et al., 1993; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Bolton and Freixas, 2000; Repullo and Suarez, 2000).”
- Monetary Policy with a Touch of Basel (2001, unknown): “…and Business Monetary policy with a touch of Basel Ralph Chamia, Thomas F. Cosimanob,∗ a International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431, United States b Department of Finance, Mendoza College of Business, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556, United States a r t i c l e i n f o”
- Government R&D subsidies as a signal for private investors (2010, background): “Our paper is related to the theoretical literature on entrepreneurial finance.4 Repullo and Suarez (2000) and Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembanelli (2006) emphasize the importance of informed financiers, like venture capitalists, to reduce the monitoring or moral hazard problem.”
- Adverse selection and financing of innovation: is there a need for R&D subsidies? (2010, methodology): “Our modeling framework builds on Holmström and Tirole (1997), which has subsequently been used to study entrepreneurial finance, eg by Repullo and Suarez (2000) and Da Rin, Nicodano and Sembanelli (2005).”