Towards effective payoffs in the prisoner’s dilemma game on scale-free networks

By Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc, Z. Danku. 2007

296 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We study the transition towards effective payoffs in the prisoner’s dilemma game on scale-free networks by introducing a normalization parameter guiding the system from accumulated payoffs to payoffs normalized with the connectivity of each agent. We show that during this transition the heterogeneity-based ability of scale-free networks to facilitate cooperative behavior deteriorates continuously, eventually collapsing with the results obtained on regular graphs. The strategy donations and adaptation probabilities of agents with different connectivities are studied. Results reveal that strategies generally spread from agents with larger towards agents with smaller degree. However, this strategy adoption flow reverses sharply in the fully normalized payoff limit. Surprisingly, cooperators occupy the hubs even if the averaged cooperation level due to partly normalized payoffs is moderate.

Subfields: Genetics, Sociology and Political Science, Statistical and Nonlinear Physics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/03db89e2f355059b08a9babcb08a208998f06b1d

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Citations in the corpus

Coevolutionary games - A mini review (2009, unknown): “…players is also the time scale separation between link and strategy adaptations, as reported in (Santos et al., 2006a; Pacheco et al., 2006a,b; Szolnoki et al., 2008a; Pacheco et al., 2008; Van Segbroeck et al., 2008; Fu et al., 2008; Szolnoki and Perc, 2009c; Van Segbroeck et al., 2009;…”
Win-Stay-Lose-Learn Promotes Cooperation in the Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game (2012, background): “In fact, payoff normalization [29–31] and conformity [32] belong to the select and very small class of mechanisms that can upset the success of cooperators on such highly heterogeneous networks.”
Structure and Dynamics of Networks (2009, background): “[2007] focus on the transient properties of the dynamics and a further study concerning this version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma on Barabási-Albert networks is available [Szolnoki et al., 2008].”
Evolution of Cooperation in Multiplex Networks (2012, background): “[15] Szolnoki, A.”
Data Based Identification and Prediction of Nonlinear and Complex Dynamical Systems (2016, background): “This experimental findingwas in striking agreementwithnumerical predictions in the literature about the relationship between individuals’ normalized payoffs and their node degrees [239].”