Characteristics of a Firm's Information Environment and the Information Asymmetry Between Insiders and Outsiders
By Richard M. Frankel, Xu Li. 2003
758 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0284a0cb7f6b38461b6176712d0b2d4fb935329f
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Brian L. Connelly
- Naomi S. Soderstrom
- Jennifer Wu Tucker
- Sreedhar T. Bharath
- Karthik Balakrishnan
- R. Duane Ireland
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- Paul Zarowin
In Finance
- Naomi S. Soderstrom
- Jennifer Wu Tucker
- Brian L. Connelly
- Sreedhar T. Bharath
- Karthik Balakrishnan
- Paul Zarowin
- R. Duane Ireland
- Daniel A. Cohen
Citations in the corpus
- The Governance Effect of the Media's News Dissemination Role: Evidence from Insider Trading (2015, neutral): “This result reconciles the findings in Frankel and Li [2004], who”
- IFRS Adoption and Accounting Quality: A Review (2007, background): “They argue that this result is consistent with the results of Harris (1995), who finds that IAS measures are similar to US GAAP.”
- Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment (2011, background): “Other disciplines have developed measures of information asymmetry and incorporated the construct in signaling studies (Aboody & Lev, 2000; Frankel & Li, 2004), and management research would benefit from this approach.”
- Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Managerial Rent Extraction: Evidence from the Profitability of Insider Trading (2013, neutral): “information asymmetry and insiders’ trading profitability (Aboody and Lev 2000; Frankel and Li 2004).”
- Corporate governance and the information environment: Evidence from state antitakeover laws ☆ (2012, methodology): “First, we employ a measure of the value relevance - 22 - of financial statements (e.g., Francis and Schipper 1999; Frankel and Li, 2004), RSQ, which is measured as the adjusted-R2 from the following firm-specific time-series regression: 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡…”
- Managerial Ownership Dynamics and Firm Value (2009, neutral): “If information asymmetries become less important as analyst coverage increases (see, for instance, Frankel and Li, 2004 ), this result is consistent with predictions that managerial ownership falls as information asymmetries decrease.”
- Analyst Initiations of Coverage and Stock Return Synchronicity (2012, neutral): “This analysis is particularly important because analysts are thought to erode the informational advantage of insiders and institutions (Frankel and Li 2004).”
- Asymmetric Information and Corporate Social Responsibility (2016, background): “…agrees that less information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders plus a greater amount of information incorporated in prices before insiders’ transactions are associated with lower price adjustments after the disclosure of these transactions (Aboody, Hughes, & Liu, 2005; Frankel & Li, 2004).”
- Does Income Smoothing Improve Earnings Informativeness (2006, positive): “Following Frankel and Li (2004), we set the number of analyst following to zero if a firm-year is not covered by I/B/E/S.”