A Materialist Theory of the Mind
By D. Armstrong. 2022
1,395 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Preface to the Paperback Edition Introduction Part One: Theories of Mind 1. A Classification of Theories of Mind 2. Dualism 3. The Attribute Theory 4. A Difficulty for any Non-materialist Theory of Mind 5. Behaviourism 6.The Central-State Theory Part Two: The Concept of Mind 7. The Will (1) 8. The Will (2) 9. Knowledge and Inference 10. Perception and Belief 11. Perception and Behaviour 12. The Secondary Qualities 13. Mental Images 14. Bodily Sensations 15. Introspection 16. Belief and Thought Part Three: The Nature of Mind 17. Identification of the Mental with the Physical Bibliography Index
Subfields: General Psychology
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/01f58898cd8d8f5735abf8ccc917e78083e448b0
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In General Psychology
- David Wallace
- Peter Carruthers
- M. Martin
- Chandra Sekhar Sripada
- Kathrin Glüer
- Andrea Borghini
- Paul E. Griffiths
- Uriah Kriegel
Citations in the corpus
- The illusion of conscious will (2007, background): “On this account, then, the events in question don’t count as conscious, or at least not by the intuitive criterion that requires us to have non-inferential, non-interpretative, access to a mental event if the latter is to qualify as a conscious one.”
- On Being Alienated (2007, background): “For those who still favour something like an observational model, however, see (Armstrong 1968), (Chisholm 1969) and(Macdonald 1998). necessarily being that way.”
- The transparency of experience (2002, background): “It is this connection between experience and belief that has prompted attempts to reduce perception to the acquisition of belief, or to dispositions to acquire belief (Armstrong, 1968; Pitcher, 1971), but one needn’t endorse such a reduction or elimination of”
- The importance of homology for biology and philosophy (2007, background): “Philosophical discussion of the classification of psychological states still bears the imprint of the philosophical school known as 'functionalism' which proposed for primarily metaphysical reasons that mental states are defined by their function (Armstrong 1968; Fodor 1975; Putnam 1967).”
- Self-Consciousness, Mental Agency, and the Clinical Psychopathology of Thought Insertion (2009, background): “…number of philosophers, including Hume, in his 1739 Treatise of Human Nature (Hume 1978), Peirce (1934), Russell (1981), and, most recently, D. M. Armstrong (1968), have maintained that one may be introspectively aware of one's mental activities without recognizing these activities as one's own.”
- Everett and structure (2001, background): “12See Lewis (1966) and Armstrong (1968) for two classic defences of functionalism; Dennett (1991a) for a more recent defence; Block (1980), Chalmers (1996), Penrose (1989) and Searle (1980) for a variety of criticisms; and Hofstadter and Dennett (1981) for a collection of articles against and…”