Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment

By Nathan M. Jensen. 2006

272 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/01e8800f88eb86a0a32cf31d83278c0e8ee2a29e

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Citations in the corpus

Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment (2008, background): “8See Jensen (2006) for a review.”
Finding the “Democratic Advantage” in Sovereign Bond Ratings: The Importance of Strong Courts, Property Rights Protection, and the Rule of Law (2012, background): “…the two anonymous reviewers of our manuscript+ 1+ See Biglaiser and Staats 2010; Biglaiser, Hicks, and Huggins 2008; Busse 2004; Feng 2001; Henisz 2000; Jensen 2003, 2006, and 2008; Li 2006 and 2009; Li and Resnick 2003; North and Weingast 1989; Schultz and Weingast 1996, 1998, and 2003; and…”
Why Should I Believe You? The Costs and Consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties (2009, background): “Foreign investors favor host countries that will not expropriate from them in the future (Büthe and Milner 2008; Henisz 2000; Jensen 2003, 2006; Li and Resnick 2003; Neumayer and Spess 2005).”
Democracy, Autocracy, and Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investment (2009, background): “More recently, political economists of FDI (e.g., Li, 2006; Li & Resnick, 2003; Jensen, 2003, 2005, 2006) apply the logic of Olson (1993, 2000) and North and Weingast (1989) on political institutions and property rights protection to explain the effect of democracy on FDI flows.”
Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions (2007, background): “Jensen (2004, 2006) has found that IMF loans have a negative impact on the inflow of foreign direct investment, and Boockmann and Dreher (2003) have shown that neither IMF credits nor IMF conditionality promote economic freedom in creditor countries.”
THE POLITICS OF INVESTMENT PARTISANSHIP: AND THE SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (2008, unknown): “While there has been extensive work on the effects of political institutions (Oneal 1994; Li and Resnick 2003; Jensen 2003, 2006; among others) and on the effects of policy decisions (trade and tax policy in particular) on aggregate FDI flows (Feldstein, Hines, and Hubbard 1995; Hines 2001), we…”