Truth and Probability

By F. P. Ramsey. 2016

935 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: History and Philosophy of Science, Statistics and Probability

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/01685429600e4a276bb82f979639379eaa8b4a35

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In History and Philosophy of Science

In Statistics and Probability

Citations in the corpus

Strictly Proper Scoring Rules (2014, background): “Dutch Book Arguments have been widely regarded as the most persuasive justification, however, they have recently begun losing some of their once widespread appeal [22].1 Recent work in epistemology takes a non-pragmatic approach using epistemic Scoring Rules (SRs) to justify the probability norm [25”
A penny for your thoughts: a survey of methods for eliciting beliefs (2014, positive): “This practice stems from the old idea that appropriately designed bets give the decision maker an incentive to report subjective beliefs truthfully (Ramsey 1926).”
Harold Jeffreys’s default Bayes factor hypothesis tests: Explanation, extension, and application in psychology (2016, background): “…calculus in order to fulfill general desiderata of consistent reasoning7 –hence, degrees of belief can be thought of as probabilities (cf. Ramsey, 1926).8 Jeffreys’s third conviction, developed together with Dr. Dorothy Wrinch, is the sim-9 plicity postulate (Wrinch & Jeffreys, 1921),…”
Logic, probability, and human reasoning. (2015, positive): “First, individuals ﬁx their degree of belief in a conditional, using Ramsey’s test [45].”
Expert Knowledge Elicitation: Subjective but Scientific (2019, background): “Theories of subjective probability, in which probability is characterized as a personal degree of belief, date back at least to Ramsey (1926), with important contributions by de Finetti (1937, 1970) and Savage (1954).”
Modeling Uncertainty in Integrated Assessment of Climate Change: A Multimodel Comparison (2018, positive): “This approach, which has its roots in the works of Ramsey (1931), de Finetti (1937), and Savage (1954), recognizes that it is not possible to obtain frequentist or actuarial probability distributions for the major parameters in integrated assessment models or in the structures of these models.”
A combined compromise solution (CoCoSo) method for multi-criteria decision-making problems (2019, background): “The first decision-making axioms were formed by Ramsey (1931).”
Probabilism, entropies and strictly proper scoring rules (2015, background): “Traditionally, axiomatic 8 justifications [6, 41], justifications on logical grounds [22] and Dutch Book 9 Arguments [12, 50] were given to this end.”
The philosophy of Bayes’ factors and the quantification of statistical evidence (2016, background): “Fortunately there are very convincing arguments for capturing beliefs about hypotheses in terms of probability assignments over an algebra (Cox, 1946; de Finetti, 1995; Joyce, 1998; Ramsey, 1931).”
Bayesian reasoning with ifs and ands and ors (2015, background): “We rather argue that people infer the conditional probability in a Ramsey test, that is, a mental simulation in which they hypothetically suppose p to be the case, make whatever changes to their beliefs are necessary to preserve consistency, and assess the probability of q on this basis (Stalnaker, ”
Eliciting Latent Predictions from Transformers with the Tuned Lens (2023, neutral): “Even when the logit lens is useful, we find that it is a biased estimator of the model’s final output: it systematically puts more probability mass on certain vocabulary items than the final layer does.”
Logical Induction (2016, methodology): “See https://intelligence.org/files/LogicalInductionAbridged.pdf for an abridged version of this paper.”