The Tradable Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons: What Have We Learned?
By T. Tietenberg. 2002
205 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/00972b95d2e740252daa8c39f30f126f3818085d
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Elinor Ostrom
- Marco A. Janssen
- Philippe Quirion
- C. Boemare
- James Acheson
- J. Marty Anderies
- Carl J. Bauer
- S. Monjon
In Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
- J. Marty Anderies
- Philippe Quirion
- C. Boemare
- Elinor Ostrom
- James Acheson
- Marco A. Janssen
- Malte Schwoon
Citations in the corpus
- Water markets and freshwater ecosystem services: Policy reform and implementation in the Columbia and Murray-Darling Basins (2009, background): “Common challenges to this model include controversy over the distribution of wealth associatedwithpatterns of access anduse, prevalenceof negative externalities (external social and environmental impacts of private decisions), and high transaction costs in reallocation (Tietenberg, 2002).”
- A Framework to Analyze the Robustness of Social-ecological Systems from an Institutional Perspective (2004, background): “Alternatively, individual rights to resource units should be determined so that a market mechanism will allocate resources to their most valued use (see Tietenberg, 2002, for a recent review of this literature).”
- Implementing greenhouse gas trading in Europe: lessons from economic literature and international experiences (2002, background): “…spatial coverage (RECLAIM), by imposing restrictions on trading (NOX OTC; see Tietenberg, 1998), or by "regulatory tiering" (SO2 in the U.S.; see Tietenberg, 2001), which combines a trading with a non-trading instrument, the latter protecting against harmful spatial clustering of emissions.”
- Institutional Failure in Resource Management (2006, background): “For example, tradable environmental allowances have worked well in controlling air pollution (Tietenberg 2002), but such programs (e.g., ITQs) have generally not done well in managing fisheries because they have motivated fishermen to high grade (discard all fish except the most desirable) (Leal…”