Firm Size, Takeover Profitability, and the Effectiveness of the Market for Corporate Control: Does the Absence of Anti-Takeover Provisions Make a Difference?

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The Sources of Value Destruction in Acquisitions by Entrenched Managers (2012, methodology): “, Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004, 2005; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Moeller et al., 2005; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007; Travlos, 1987). Specifically, we include prioryear stock return (stock run-up), size, firm age,”
Restraining Overconfident CEOs through Improved Governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2015, unknown): “The pre-announcement and post-announcement returns are largely consistent with prior studies, documenting a relatively low cumulative abnormal return for acquirers on average (as per Duchin and Schmidt, 2013; Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011).”