Location-based compromise-tolerant security mechanisms for wireless sensor networks
By Yanchao Zhang, Wei Liu, Wenjing Lou, Yuguang Fang. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 2006
386 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Node compromise is a serious threat to wireless sensor networks deployed in unattended and hostile environments. To mitigate the impact of compromised nodes, we propose a suite of location-based compromise-tolerant security mechanisms. Based on a new cryptographic concept called pairing, we propose the notion of location-based keys (LBKs) by binding private keys of individual nodes to both their IDs and geographic locations. We then develop an LBK-based neighborhood authentication scheme to localize the impact of compromised nodes to their vicinity. We also present efficient approaches to establish a shared key between any two network nodes. In contrast to previous key establishment solutions, our approaches feature nearly perfect resilience to node compromise, low communication and computation overhead, low memory requirements, and high network scalability. Moreover, we demonstrate the efficacy of LBKs in counteracting several notorious attacks against sensor networks such as the Sybil attack, the identity replication attack, and wormhole and sinkhole attacks. Finally, we propose a location-based threshold-endorsement scheme, called LTE, to thwart the infamous bogus data injection attack, in which adversaries inject lots of bogus data into the network. The utility of LTE in achieving remarkable energy savings is validated by detailed performance evaluation.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/feda7a2159578bf820186abf3d3d573c7063e87e
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In Computer Networks and Communications
Citations in the corpus
- Security of the Internet of Things: Vulnerabilities, Attacks, and Countermeasures (2019, methodology): “er of neighboring nodes. Thus, compromised nodes can only communicate with a limited number of verified neighboring nodes, which also limits the impact of Sybil attacks. Moreover, ID-based public keys [108] also can defeat the Sybil attack because both the ID and location information were taken into ”
- Securing wireless sensor networks: a survey (2008, methodology): “[77, 78] proposed the notion of location-based keys by binding private keys of individual nodes to their IDs and their locations.”