Federalism and low-maintenance constituencies: Territorial dimensions of economic reform in Argentina

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The Politics of Re-centralization in Argentina and Brazil (2004, background): “These transfers have loomed large in the study of Argentine intergovernmental relations ever since (Gibson and Calvo 2000; Remmer and Wibbels 2000; Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi 2000).”
A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective (2005, background): “This corresponds to what we know about how federalism and intergovernmental relations have historically evolved in these countries (Gibson and Calvo 2000, Gibson and Falleti 2004, Samuels 2003).”
Beyond Clientelism (2008, unknown): “And the Peronist vote in Argentina is higher and more stable in areas with dense party organizations and extensive public employment (Calvo & Gibson, 2001; Calvo & Murillo, 2004).”
When Parties Meet Voters (2013, result): “Population density has a significant negative effect as well for both the PJ and the UCR, in line with the literature that shows the dependence of the population of less urbanized provinces on public employment in Argentina (Gibson and Calvo 2000).”
Strength in Numbers? (2002, background): “This may help explain why Gibson et al. (forthcoming) find a much stronger small-state bias in Argentina and Brazil, which have highly malapportioned lower chambers, than in the United States and Mexico. Recall from Table 1 that both of the EU’s legislative chambers are among the most malapportioned”