CSIDH: An Efficient Post-Quantum Commutative Group Action

By Wouter Castryck, Tanja Lange, Chloe Martindale, Lorenz Panny, Joost Renes. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2018

558 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We propose an efficient commutative group action suitable for non-interactive key exchange in a post-quantum setting. Our construction follows the layout of the Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov cryptosystem, but we apply it to supersingular elliptic curves defined over a large prime field \(\mathbb F_p\), rather than to ordinary elliptic curves. The Diffie–Hellman scheme resulting from the group action allows for public-key validation at very little cost, runs reasonably fast in practice, and has public keys of only 64 bytes at a conjectured AES-128 security level, matching NIST’s post-quantum security category I.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fcef8018251c6b6cedfe162d6bd0662c79a1e09f

How researchers see this paper

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In Artificial Intelligence

1. Wouter Castryck
2. Thomas Decru

In Information Systems

1. Wouter Castryck
2. Thomas Decru

Citations in the corpus

• An Efficient Key Recovery Attack on SIDH (2023, background): “In particular, it cannot be adjusted in an obvious way to attack primitives that do not reveal this information, such as CRS/CSIDH [10], [39], [7] and SQISign [12], and the general supersingular isogeny path problem remains unaffected [44].”