No signaling and quantum key distribution.

By Jonathan Barrett, Lucien Hardy, Adrian Kent. Physical Review Letters, 2004

789 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Standard quantum key distribution protocols are provably secure against eavesdropping attacks, if quantum theory is correct. It is theoretically interesting to know if we need to assume the validity of quantum theory to prove the security of quantum key distribution, or whether its security can be based on other physical principles. The question would also be of practical interest if quantum mechanics were ever to fail in some regime, because a scientifically and technologically advanced eavesdropper could perhaps use postquantum physics to extract information from quantum communications without necessarily causing the quantum state disturbances on which existing security proofs rely. Here we describe a key distribution scheme provably secure against general attacks by a postquantum eavesdropper limited only by the impossibility of superluminal signaling. Its security stems from violation of a Bell inequality.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fc5b6f804af3f5937de217e2064e0a00f4b31d79

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Citations in the corpus

Fully device independent quantum key distribution (2012, methodology): “tistical tests. The germ of the idea for device-independence may already be seenin Ekert’s original entanglement-based protocol for QKD [Eke91], and was made more explicit by Barrett, Hardy, and Kent [BHK05], who showed how to generate a single random bit secure against any non-signalling eavesdropp”
How "Quantum" is the D-Wave Machine? (2014, background): “rld of quantum devices, it will become increasingly important to test that these devices behave according to specication. While this is clearly a central issue in the context of quantum cryptography [4, 27] and certied random number generators [17, 26], it is also quite fundamental in the context of”
Quantum random number generators (2016, background): “…quantum random number generators can be extended to an even more general model where quantum mechanics needs not to be true, following the example of the device independent quantum key distribution protocols (Barrett et al., 2012, 2005) that only require the no-signalling principle to hold.”
Secure quantum key distribution with realistic devices (2020, background): “Furthermore, device-independent QKD was proposed (Acín et al., 2007; Barrett et al., 2005; Mayers and Yao, 1998) to allow QKD with uncharaterized devices.”
Monogamy of non-local quantum correlations (2006, positive): “Such a bound on the maximum entangled value of a Bell inequality is termed a Tsirelson bound (Cirel’son 1980). Although we do not yet know how to calculate the best such bound for an arbitrary Bell inequality, a number of ad hoc techniques have been developed (Cirel’son 1980; Tsirelson 1987; Buhrman”
Unbounded Violation of Tripartite Bell Inequalities (2007, methodology): “What do measured correlations tell us about a quantum system, if we do not have a priori knowledge about the observables or even the size of the underlying Hilbert space? This type of question naturally arises in cryptography, where one wants to avoid any kind of auxiliary assumption necessary for s”
Random numbers certified by Bell’s theorem (2009, neutral): “The current experiment does not reach the catalysis regime mentioned above, owing to the low success probability of heralded entanglement generation (2 3 10 2 8 ) (ref.”
A device-independent quantum key distribution system for distant users (2021, background): “resources consumed and block-length considerations [17].”
Free randomness can be amplified (2011, methodology): “We remark that this proof is a generalization of one given in [10], which in turn was based on a series of work [15, 16] going back to the first provably secure device-independent key distribution protocol [14].”