Quantifying the Effect of the Principal-Agent Problem on US Residential Energy Use

By Scott Murtishaw, J. Sathaye. 2006

112 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Building and Construction, Economics and Econometrics, Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fc283d17a0a4d690b4be4f42356840b9d9ad3021

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Building and Construction

1. Kenneth T. Gillingham
2. D. Rapson
3. Hunt Allcott
4. X. Labandeira
5. A. Ramos
6. Michael Greenstone
7. Karen L. Palmer

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Kenneth T. Gillingham
2. D. Rapson
3. Matthew Harding
4. C. Cattaneo
5. X. Labandeira
6. A. Ramos
7. T. Litman
8. Hunt Allcott

In Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment

1. Kenneth T. Gillingham
2. D. Rapson
3. C. Cattaneo
4. X. Labandeira
5. A. Ramos
6. Hunt Allcott
7. T. Litman
8. Karen L. Palmer

Citations in the corpus

• Split Incentives in Residential Energy Consumption (2012, background): “Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) provide quantitative estimates of the potential importance of principal-agent problems between landlords and tenants in several areas of residential energy use.”
• Chapter 5 – Is There an Energy Efficiency Gap? (2012, unknown): “Of U.S. households, 29 percent are rental units where the renter pays energy bills (Murtishaw and Sathaye 2006).”