Distributed Pseudo-random Functions and KDCs

By Moni Naor, Benny Pinkas, Omer Reingold. 1999

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Citations in the corpus

Ekiden: A Platform for Confidentiality-Preserving, Trustworthy, and Performant Smart Contracts (2018, positive): “[57] introduce distributed PRFs, which are such that parties with shares of s can evaluate fs(·) without reconstructing s.”
Riposte: An Anonymous Messaging System Handling Millions of Users (2015, methodology): “Unlike a conventional PRG, which can be implemented using AES or another fast block cipher in counter mode, known constructions of seed-homomorphic PRGs require algebraic groups [64] or lattice-based crypto graphy [3], [11].”
Share Conversion, Pseudorandom Secret-Sharing and Applications to Secure Computation (2005, methodology): “A similar scheme that was suggested in [27] relies on replicated PRFs but does not use share conversion.”
Key Homomorphic PRFs and Their Applications (2013, methodology): “Naor, Pinkas, and Reingold [28] showed that FDDH is a secure PRF in the random oracle model assuming the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in G.”
Improving privacy and security in multi-authority attribute-based encryption (2009, methodology): “[11] Moni Naor, Benny Pinkas, and Omer Reingold.”
Random Oracles in Constantinople: Practical Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement Using Cryptography (2000, methodology): “[30], but our analysis is more refined: first, for the single-parameter setting, we need a weaker intractability assumption, and second, we provide an analysis of the scheme in the dual-threshold setting, which is not considered by Naor et al.”
Pseudorandom Functions: Three Decades Later (2017, methodology): “In the other direction, Naor and Reingold [108] and Nisan and Wigderson [115] give constructions of PRFs from functions that are hard to predict on a chosen and random input, respectively.”
Secure and Efficient Asynchronous Broadcast Protocols (2001, methodology): “Apart from ordinary digital signature schemes, we use collision-free hashing, pseudo-random generators, robust non-interactive dual-threshold signatures [18], threshold public-key encryption schemes [19], and a threshold pseudo-random function [13,6].”
Revocation and Tracing Schemes for Stateless Receivers (2001, unknown): “In such a case the distributed pseudo-random functions of [39] may be used to define the labels.”