Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in Federations

By Michael Keen, Christos Kotsogiannis. 2003

114 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/faca8ebea08edd10ca7c14cf12a43478a9451762

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Marius Brülhart
2. Bruno De Borger
3. Wilfried Pauwels
4. Mario Jametti

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Marius Brülhart
2. Bruno De Borger
3. Wilfried Pauwels
4. Mario Jametti
5. David Castells‐Quintana
6. Vicente Royuela

In Political Science and International Relations

1. Marius Brülhart
2. Bruno De Borger
3. Wilfried Pauwels
4. Mario Jametti

Citations in the corpus

• Vertical Versus Horizontal Tax Externalities: An Empirical Test (2006, background): “…tax rates fall in the degree of fragmentation even with benevolent government; and, in models featuring vertical externalities, the relationship between government size and de- 5 centralization could be positive even in a federation of Leviathan governments (Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2003).”
• A Nash bargaining solution to models of tax and investment competition: tolls and investment in serial transport corridors (2010, background): “…the seminal paper by Mintz and Tulkens (1986), an extensive literature has been developed; important contributions include, among many others, Kanbur and Keen (1993), Wilson (1999), Janeba (2000), Zodrow (2003), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003), Wilson and Wildasin (2004), and Borck and Pflüger (2006).”