Appropriating the Commons - a Theoretical Explanation

By Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher. Social Science Research Network, 2001

175 citations recorded by the source corpus.

In this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. When communication or informal sanctions are available, however, appropriation behaviour is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences.

Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f95c55c2fb7b0b688e36ef8b85fe0cc429be22b4

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Demography

1. Elinor Ostrom
2. J. Bergh
3. Charles Bellemare
4. Sabine Kröger
5. Sigrid Stagl

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Fiorenza Micheli
2. Elinor Ostrom
3. E. Araral
4. Marcel J. Dorsch
5. C. Flachsland

In Safety Research

1. S. Ramírez-Sánchez
2. Elinor Ostrom
3. E. Araral
4. J. Bergh
5. Sigrid Stagl
6. Charles Bellemare
7. Sabine Kröger

Citations in the corpus

• What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users? Experimental Evidence from the Field (2009, unknown): “3 Inequity Aversion Our model of reciprocity and pure self-interest generates a best response function that is similar to that generated by the model of inequity aversion presented by Falk et al. (2002). They adapted Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) notion of inequity aversion to the common pool resource p”
• What Explains Collective Action in the Commons? Theory and Evidence from the Philippines (2009, background): “As Olson (1965) argued, unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interest.”