Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets

By Raymond J. Fisman, Edward Miguel. Journal of Political Economy, 2007

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How researchers see this paper

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Public Governance and Corporate Fraud: Evidence from the Recent Anti-corruption Campaign in China (2018, background): “The areas with poor legal enforcement tend to have a higher level of corruption (Fisman and Miguel 2007).”
Chinese aid and local corruption (2018, neutral): “3 there is some evidence to suggest that they are easier to change for the worse than for the better (Fisman and Miguel, 2007; Zhou et al., 2015).”
Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India (2012, neutral): “The allocation of expenditures across villages depends upon θ.”
Corruption and culture: An Experimental Analysis (2010, background): “However, the null finding for graduate students and the finding that time spent in the UK was associated with a decline in the propensity to engage in bribery indicate, first, that Fisman and Miguel's (2007) conclusions should not be viewed as applying generally to all immigrants and, second, that i”
US political corruption and firm financial policies (2016, background): “4 The effects of cross-country differences in attitudes toward corruption can be nontrivial: Fisman and Miguel (2007) find that United Nations diplomats accumulated parking violations while in New York City at rates that reflected corruption at home.”