Voluntary Disclosure of Management Earnings Forecasts in IPO Prospectuses

By V. Jog, Bruce McConomy. 2003

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Corporate Risk Reporting (2008, background): “First, due to the high information asymmetry when raising capital from outside investors, market participants and regulators insist on the disclosure of material information in prospectuses, especially when it concerns an initial public offering (Jog & McConomy, 2003).”
Voluntary disclosure of information when firms are uncertain of investor response (2007, unknown): “Jog and McConomy (2003) ﬁnd for Canadian IPO ﬁrms that the subsample of forecasting ﬁrms exhibits slightly lower mean and median values for revenues, net income and gross proceeds of the equity offering than the subsample of nonforecasting ﬁrms.”
Determinants of intellectual capital disclosure in prospectuses of initial public offerings (2008, methodology): “Directional signs on all significant correlations between dependent and control variables are as expected (e.g. Firth and Liau-Tan, 1998; Jog and McConomy, 2003).”
Earnings Quality and International IPO Underpricing (2011, unknown): “Below, we construct and use the earnings quality measures in Leuz et al. (2003), Bhattacharya et al.”
The endogeneity bias in the relation between cost-of-debt capital and corporate disclosure policy (2005, unknown): “See also, Jog and McConomy (2003) and Mak (1996) results are likely to be misleading.”