Income Tax Competition at the State and Local Level in Switzerland

By Lars P. Feld, G. Kirchgässner. Social Science Research Network, 2001

158 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Tax competition is supposed to lead to inefficiencies in the provision of public goods and difficulties for decentralized redistribution. A necessary condition for these effects to occur is that residence and location decisions are determined by fiscal considerations. In this paper, the impact of personal income taxes and transfer payments on residence decisions of taxpayers is analyzed using cross sectional data on the distribution of different groups of taxpayers in different income groups among the 26 Swiss cantons and the 137 largest Swiss cities. We find that tax competition with respect to personal income taxes is relatively strong in Switzerland.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f90bfdebf6e12bf71841b4db1e45a1008f96f61c

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Citations in the corpus

The Influence of Labor Taxes on the Migration of Skilled Workers (2009, unknown): “Thus, the recent empirical literature provides increasing support for the ‘positive selection’ of migrants and, hence, cross-border flows of skilled workers (see Chiswick, 1999; Liebig and Sousa-Poza, 2004; and Grogger and Hanson, 2008).”
On Spatial Public Finance Empirics (2005, background): “Moreover, a recent empirical literature has tested for international tax competition (Goodspeed, 2000, 2002; Altshuler and Goodspeed, 2002; Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano, 2002; Devereux, Griffith and Klemm, 2002; Redoano, 2003; Evers, de Mooij and Vollebergh, 2004), Tiebout-like competition for mob”
Income Segregation and Local Progressive Taxation: Empirical Evidence from Switzerland (2006, background): “While the virtues of decentralized financial responsibility are uncontested, the resulting tax differentials are highly disputed.”