Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy

By Jeffrey W. Cason. Perspectives on Politics, 2005

136 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f8b4417b9f70496202645bffc2de4bd8ea3ace93

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Bumba Mukherjee
2. Neil Malhotra
3. Andrew J. Healy
4. David S. Brown
5. A. M. Mobarak
6. Helen V. Milner
7. Edward D. Mansfield
8. E. Reinhardt

In Political Science and International Relations

1. Andrew J. Healy
2. Neil Malhotra
3. David S. Brown
4. A. M. Mobarak
5. Bumba Mukherjee
6. Helen V. Milner
7. Scott Ashworth

Citations in the corpus

• Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy (2009, result): “…support for particularistic spending, especially as compared to other developed countries (e.g., Ferejohn 1974; Levitt and Snyder 1997; McGillivray 2004; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Stein and Bickers 1995), which may reflect the fact that voters particularly value this kind of spending.”
• Democratization and Economic Globalization (2009, background): “…labor specificity, and geographic concentration of certain industries in advanced industrial democracies, affect trade protection in the form of tariffs or NTBs (Busch & Reinhardt 2000, 2005; Gowa 1988; Hiscox 2002; Mansfield & Busch 1995; McGillivray 2004; Nielson 2003; Pahre 2007; Rogowski 1987).”
• The Distributional Consequences of Preferential Trade Liberalization: Firm-Level Evidence (2017, unknown): “Hathaway 1998; McGillivray 2004.”
• Pork Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953-1994 (2008, unknown): “We extend (McGillivray 2004) and hypothesize that in open-list PR, legislators affiliated with governing parties target their home districts in order to prevent core voters from switching support to another local candidate on the same party list.”
• The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection (2007, unknown): “6See Rodrik (1995), Milner (2002), and McGillivray (2004) for overviews of this literature.”
• The Transforming Power of Democracy: Regime Type and the Distribution of Electricity (2009, background): “Interest group theories of regulation (Becker 1983; Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1971) and theories of decision making under electoral constraints (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2001, 2002, 2003; Foster and Rosenzweig 2001, Grossman and Helpman 2001, Lake and Baum 2001; McGillivray 2004) generally predict that”
• A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics (2005, unknown): “t{j,k},g = ¡ 1 3 − α g ¢ x∗ 2 3(β + γ)− γ ¡ 1 3 − α g ¢ for all g, / ∈ {j, k} , (7)”