Imperfect Competition in the Interbank Market for Liquidity as aRationale for Central Banking
By V. Acharya, Denis Gromb, Tanju Yorulmazer. 2009
303 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f8b07e8a541a3011119ce4f1d3fc67e36a012825
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Finance
- David Skeie
- V. Acharya
- Tanju Yorulmazer
- C. Borio
- Markus K. Brunnermeier
- Allen N. Berger
- Luigi Bocola
- Murillo Campello
Citations in the corpus
- Simulation methods to assess the danger of contagion in interbank markets (2011, unknown): “(2000) Strategic behaviour by potential lenders Acharya et al. (2008)”
- The formation of financial networks: XXX (2013, unknown): “Acharya et al. (2012) emphasize some of the problems that occurs when liquidity transfers occur ex-post.”
- A model of liquidity hoarding and term premia in inter-bank markets (2011, background): “For a given term inter-bank market rate r; the bank chooses (i) date 0 term lending l and (ii) date 1 borrowing with face amount f (due at date 2) in order to maximize its expected pro t L = (y + lr f); (2)”
- The Term Structure of Interbank Risk (2012, unknown): “The speculative motive for cash hoarding is modeled by Acharya, Gromb, and Yorulmazer (2012), Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2011), and Diamond and Rajan (2011).”
- Bank competition, crisis and risk taking: Evidence from emerging markets in Asia (2013, unknown): “Insert Table 8 here Our results are somehow consistent with Acharya et al (2012), although they analyze the joint role of the lender of last resort and market power in interbank markets in overcoming bank liquidity risk.”
- Liquidity Hoarding and Interbank Market Spreads: The Role of Counterparty Risk (2009, unknown): “max Lh; ; L h; ; R h; p [R (1 h; ) + h; (1 + h; l ) (1 + r )Lh; (1 h)d2] (1)”
- Competition and Stability in Banking (2016, unknown): “The presence of market power in the interbank market may either facilitate liquidity provision (because liquidity is a public good, so sound banks may have an incentive to provide liquidity to a bank in trouble to avoid contagion (Allen and Gale 2004, Sáez and Shi 2004) or may impede its provision (”