Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation

By Michael Strevens. 2008

646 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, History and Philosophy of Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f8a5eb563a5a98a9ce4203b238f5b703c5aa1184

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In Artificial Intelligence

In History and Philosophy of Science

Citations in the corpus

Why Attention is Not Explanation: Surgical Intervention and Causal Reasoning about Neural Models (2020, methodology): “Below, we summarize these accounts, derived from research at the interface between philosophy of explanation and philosophy of scientiﬁc models, and the more general research area in optimality theories of explanation (Strevens, 2008; Rice, 2015; Potochnik, 2018).”
The explanation game: a formal framework for interpretable machine learning (2020, neutral): “5 For book length treatments of the topic, see (Halpern, 2016; Strevens, 2010; Woodward, 2003).”
Evaluating everyday explanations (2017, result): “While this finding is at odds with claims that simpler explanations are usually better, it is consistent with prominent theories in philosophy that suggest the role of an explanation is to identify the causal network of events leading up to an event (Salmon, 1984; Strevens, 2008).”
Reasons, Values, Stakeholders: A Philosophical Framework for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (2021, background): “Thus, perhaps explanations are arguments that provide information about causal relations in the world [52, 53].”
Abstract Explanations in Science (2015, background): “I claim that the explanation discussed earlier violates Strevens’ cohesion requirement. Recall that Plateau’s laws apply to soap films of any sort and also to frames composed of any material and varying widely in structure, thickness, and material composition. So, there are two ways that this class ”
The role of explanation in discovery and generalization: evidence from category learning (2010, background): “Pattern subsumption theories propose that the defining property of an explanation is that it demonstrates how what is being explained is an instance of a general pattern (for discussion, see Salmon, 1989; Strevens, 2008).”