Earnings management, surplus free cash flow, and external monitoring
By Richard Chung, Michael Firth, Jeong‐Bon Kim. 2005
410 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f836e68a01805b911f1c26245913534d348539cd
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Maria Goranova
- M. Hadani
- Raihan Khan
- Norhayati Zamri
- Seraina C. Anagnostopoulou
- Aziatul Waznah Ghazali
- A. M. Priego
- Elena Merino
In Strategy and Management
- M. Hadani
- Maria Goranova
- Raihan Khan
- Norhayati Zamri
- Seraina C. Anagnostopoulou
- Aziatul Waznah Ghazali
- A. M. Priego
- Elena Merino
Citations in the corpus
- Has goodwill accounting gone bad? (2017, background): “The active monitoring role of institutional investors is supported by a series of empirical studies (e.g., Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987; Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Chung et al., 2005).”
- The Impact of Leverage on Real Earnings Management (2013, background): “Big 6/5/4 has a good brand name and may provide higher quality of audit and is able to restrict discretionary accruals in management (Becker et al., 1998 and Chung et al., 2005).”
- The effect of financial leverage on real and accrual-based earnings management (2017, background): “(2005) and Cohen et al. (2008) argue that RM is a more costly strategy than AM. In a similar vein, Bhorjaj et al. (2009) shows that RM to meet earnings benchmarks is harmful for stock market performance in the long run, but has some temporary benefits, while Badertscher (2011) provides evidence on t”
- CEO Duality, Agency Costs, and Internal Capital Allocation Efficiency (2019, neutral): “Firms with excess free cash flow encounter major agency problems, especially if their investment opportunities are limited (see, for example, Jensen, 1986; Lang et al. , 1991, Chung et al. , 2005).”
- Effect of institutional ownership on dividends: An agency-theory-based analysis (2016, background): “Agency costs are likely to be high in firms with both free cash flow and poor investment opportunities, as the managers are more likely to have negative net present value projects at these firms (Chung, Firth, and Kim, 2005).”
- Investigating the Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and Earnings Management: Evidence from Spain (2016, background): “There exists extensive literature relating disretional accruals and free cash flow (Chung et al., 2005; echow and Ge, 2006; Bukit and Iskandar, 2009).”
- Surplus Free Cash Flow, Earnings Management and Audit Committee (2009, methodology): “Otherwise surplus free cash flow is coded 0 (Chung et al., 2005).”
- Corporate governance effect on financial distress likelihood: Evidence from Spain (2016, background): “Daily and Dalton (1994b), Firth, Chung, and Kim (2005) and Mangena and Chamisa (2008) found a negative relationship between institutional investors and financial distress likelihood.”
- Debt, diversification and earnings management (2010, background): “2003; Chung, Firth and Kim, 2005; and DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994), insider sales”
- The Impacts of Free Cash Flows and Agency Costs on Firm Performance (2010, background): “According to literature, there were seven proxy variables suggested to measure agency costs: They are total asset turnover [25]; Singh and Davidson [26]), operating expense to sales ratio [25], administrative expense to sales ratio [26], earnings volatility, advertising and R & D expense to sales ra”